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ABSTRACT
　日本の大学生237人に3つの道徳的側面（独裁的支配，絶対的忠誠，応報的罰）に基づく9つの教訓
話を読ませ，道徳的に望ましい2つの結末（帰結主義の結末，非帰結主義の結末）について評定を求め
た。参加者には自身の性格特性についても評定を求めた。認知スタイルや怒り易さではなく，嫌悪感感
受性が3つの道徳的側面における非帰結主義的態度を有意に予測した。この結果は，嫌悪感感受性にお
ける個人差が，道徳的判断の厳しさだけではなく，非帰結主義的態度も予測することを示唆している。
   237 Japanese university-students read nine moral stories based on three moral aspects (absolute rules, absolute 
loyalty and retributive punishment) and rated which of two endings (one typically consequentialistic and one 
typically non-consequentialistic) they believed to be morally preferable. Participants also rated themselves on 
several personality-variables. Disgust-sensitivity, but not cognitive style or anger proneness, significantly predicted 
non-consequentialistic attitudes in all three aspects. The results suggest that individual differences in disgust-
sensitivity not only predict the severity of moral judgments, but also the amount of non-consequentialistic 
attitudes.
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1.  Introduction
   This study aims to unite two separate branches of 
contemporary moral psychology. The first branch 
concerns the distinction between consequentialistic 
and non-consequentialistic moral judgments. People’s 
attitudes when faced with consequentialistic and 
non-consequentialistic moral dilemmas change 
depending on the context. Even subtle situational 
changes can shift people’s moral attitudes from very 
consequentialistic to very non-consequentialistic. 
The second branch is the relation between moral 
attitudes and individual differences. Some rather 
stable personality traits have been linked to specific 
moral tendencies and political orientations. In this 
study, I merge these two branches and investigate if 
there  are  any consis tent  pat terns  between 
personality traits and consequentialistic attitudes.  
1.1   Consequentialistic & Non-consequentialistic 
moral attitudes
   In this article, moral attitudes are classified as 
either consequentialistic or non-consequentialistic. 
Philosophers from the consequentialistic flank 
judge  ac t s  mere ly  on  bas i s  o f  aggrega te 
consequences while their non-consequentialistic 
colleagues judge moral acts with other standards as 
well (for example individual rights or specific 
duties). To further separate the two types of 
a t t i tudes ,  I  adopt  a  u t i l i ta r ian  vers ion  of 
consequentialism and equate good consequences 
with pleasure and bad consequences with suffering. 
This classification of moral attitudes in not without 
c o n t r o v e r s y  b u t  h a s  o f t e n  b e e n  u s e d  i n 
contemporary moral psychology (Bartels, 2008; 
Lombrozo, 2007; Uhlman et al. 2009).
   The most commonly used dilemma where the two 
types of attitudes differ is the so-called trolley 
dilemma and i ts  variations (Greene, 2008; 
Thomson, 1985). In brief, the dilemma is about 
whether it is morally acceptable to sacrifice (kill) 
one in order to save five? The characteristically 
consequentialistic answer is that it is acceptable 
because the total suffering will be less, while non-
consequentialistic theories will oppose this, as 
killing can be seen as breaking an absolute rule or 
as a forbidden disrespect of the single person’s right 
to life (Thomson, 1985). 
   When asked, people judge different versions of 
the dilemma differently. While about 80% believe it 
to be acceptable to sacrifice one person to save five 
by pulling a lever, only 15% believe it to be right to 
do it by pushing the man in front of the train 
(Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006; Greene, 2008). 
This shows that the degree of consequentialism in 
people’s moral attitudes is very context-sensitive. 
Thanks to recent research, we now know more 
about which contextual details that “push our moral 
buttons” and make us positive or negative towards 
certain acts. Just to mention a few, people will react 
more negatively towards direct harm than towards 
indirect harm (Paharia, et al., 2009) and that 
intentionality (in contrast to an expected side-effect) 
together with personal force make us judge 
consequentialistic acts more negatively (Greene et 
al. 2009).
   The trolley-dilemma is very useful, but it should 
be noted that it covers only one aspect of the 
differences between consequentialistic and non-
consequentialistic moral theories. I will refer to this 
as “the absolute rule-aspect”. While this aspect is 
central when distinguishing consequentialistic and 
non-consequentialistic attitudes, it would be 
unwarranted to define the difference by exclusively 
using this characteristic. Consequentialism and non-
consequentialism disagree in several moral 
problems that seem unrelated to the trolley dilemma 
(Greene, 2008). While several studies use the 
a b s o l u t e  r u l e - a s p e c t  w h e n  i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
consequentialistic attitudes, few studies include 
other aspects. This might cast doubt on whether the 
results apply to consequentialism in general or 
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exclusively on the absolute-rule aspect. The current 
study does not cover all areas that differentiate 
consequentialism and non-consequentialism, but at 
least include two additional aspects that on the 
surface seem unrelated to the trolley dilemma - 
absolute loyalty and retributive punishment.
   Absolute loyalty (partiality) contradicts the idea 
of universalism and is therefore incompatible with 
consequentialism. On the other hand, absolute 
loyalty is something morally virtuous from an 
agent-relative non-consequentialist perspective. The 
most strong and hard-wired form of absolute loyalty 
is probably the idea of loyalty towards one’s kin 
(Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Most consequentialists 
recognize and accept the innate partiality parents 
feel for their offspring and might even accept some 
degree of loyalty as an instrumental value in order 
to reach better consequences. However, while 
consequent ia l i s t s  see  k in-par t ia l i ty  as  an 
inescapable human tendency, non-consequentialists 
see kin-partiality as a nugget of moral wisdom. In 
some situations, the typical consequentialistic 
choice and the typical non-consequentialistic choice 
will undoubtedly be in sharp contrast to each other 
(Greene, 2008, Singer, 2005).
   Retributive punishment is another aspect where 
consequentialistic moral theories and (most) non-
consequentialistic theories pull in different 
d i r ec t ions  (Greene ,  2008) .  Accord ing  to 
consequentialistic theories, no unnecessary 
suffering for the criminal can be justified and legal 
punishment should only look forward and focus on 
degree of deterrence and other social implications 
(Dolinko, 2005). In sharp contrast, according to 
non-consequentialistic retributional theories, the 
punishment should fit the crime. Acts of crime 
should be punished no matter future consequences, 
and the criminal should somehow “suffer for his 
sins” (Ten, 2005).
1.2  Individual differences
   Contextual differences are very fascinating and 
there is still much research to be done in that area. 
However, even within homogenous populations, it 
is relatively easy to find individual differences in 
moral attitudes and behavioural tendencies. 
A l though  t he r e  ex i s t  numerous  pos s ib l e 
demographic and psychological aspects that could 
relate to moral attitudes, this study focuses on four 
variables that have been researched and proven 
relevant for moral attitudes on the contextual level, 
but that also can be investigated on the individual 
trait level. 
1.2.1   Cognitive style: Rationality & Intuition
   According to modern emotion-based models 
about causes of our moral judgments (Haidt, 2001, 
Greene et al., 2001), we are mainly guided by our 
intuitions when we make moral judgments. These 
intuitions are quick, strong and motivate us directly 
via gut-feelings. Sunstein (2005) suggests that these 
intuitions work as “moral heuristics” and usually 
help us reach acceptable judgments without using 
too much energy. However, like non-moral 
heuristics, the moral heuristics sometimes misfire. 
   Very much in line with the current article, Greene 
(2008) suggests that consequentialism and non-
consequentialism could reflect two cognitive styles 
that guide us in decision-making. These systems 
can roughly be understood as the rational and the 
intuitive systems respectively (Pacini & Epstein, 
1999). In situations with more cognitive load, 
it takes longer time to reach consequentialistic 
conclusions and fMRI-studies reveal that damage 
in parts of the brain connected with emotion causes 
more consequentialistic judgments (Greene et al., 
2008; Koenigs, et al., 2007). As consequentialistic 
judgments increase with available deliberation-time, 
and when alternatives are shown jointly (Kogut & 
Ritov 2005), it seems possible that most people’s 
initial judgments are non-conscqucntialistic, but 
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that a situational opportunity together with an 
intrapersonal ability to reason deliberately makes 
people more consequentialistic (Greene, 2008). 
   Several articles have discussed individual 
differences within rationality and intuition as two 
cognitive traits. People differ both in ability and 
preference when it comes to rational and intuitive 
thinking and interestingly the two variables are 
orthogonal (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). In the moral 
realm, a study by Friedrich & McGuire (2010), 
found that participants with low trait rationality 
were more l ikely to donate money in non-
consequentialistic ways and in another study 
intuitive people were more inclined to respond in a 
deontological (non-consequentialistic) way in 
“absolute rule”-dilemmas (Bartels, 2008). Based on 
the situational-level research presented above, the 
first hypothesis is:
   H1) People with a highly rational cognitive style 
will express more consequentialistic moral attitudes 
compared to people with low rational cognitive 
style. In contrast, people with a highly intuitive 
cognitive style will express less consequentialistic 
moral attitudes compared to people with low 
intuitive cognitive style. 
1.2.2   Emotional Personality: Anger & Disgust
   Moral emotions have been shown to relate to our 
moral judgments (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). 
Moral emotions include emotions of positive and 
negative valence that has a clear target. Two often-
discussed moral emotions are anger and disgust. 
Even if anger and disgust both have negative 
valence, most models of emotions see them as 
distinct from each other (Hucherson & Gross, 
2011). For example, while disgust is avoidance-
oriented, anger makes us attack the target of the 
emotion, and is therefore considered approach-
oriented (Harmon–Jones & Allen 1998; Oum & 
Lieberman, 2007).
   There is a relationship between anger, moral 
attitudes and punitive & harmful behaviour 
(Tetlock, et al. 2007).  For example did anger 
strongly predict preferred punishment when 
participants heard about criminal acts while degree 
of deterrence hardly predicted preferred punishment 
at all (Kahneman, Schkade & Sunstein 1998). Also, 
people who were in an angry state made harsher 
judgments about injustice than calm people 
(Horberg, el al. 2009). In these studies, anger was 
induced in people experimentally, but there also 
exist individual differences in how easily and how 
intensely people become angry. (Deffenbacher et 
al., 1995). This individual difference is called 
anger-proneness. When faced with the same 
provoking situation, people high in anger-proneness 
react more strongly compared to people with low 
anger-proneness. As a higher degree of anger on the 
situational level predicts at least some aspects of 
non-consequentialism, the idea is that this pattern 
will emerge on the individual level as well.
   H2) People with high anger-proneness will 
express less consequentialistic attitudes than people 
with low anger-proneness 
   The origin of disgust is evolutional and disgust 
was very beneficial in order to give humans an 
automatic negative response towards harmful 
substances and counter-evolutional  sexual 
behaviour (Tybur, Lieberman & Griskevicius, 
2009). The feeling of disgust has however, evolved, 
and does now also involve social disgust and 
disgust towards death (Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 
2008). Disgust has been shown to predict moral 
judgments. For example, by making a story more 
disgusting (without changing its content) people 
become more morally condemning (Haidt & 
Björklund, 2008). Using hypnosis in order to make 
people more disgust-sensitive makes them blame 
more harshly in cases of “harmless wrongdoing” 
(Wheatley & Haidt 2005), and participants’ moral 
judgments when they are at a dirty desk are more 
severe compared to people  who are in a clean 
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setting (Schnall, et al., 2008). 
   Disgust is often researched as an individual 
difference factor and is referred to as “disgust-
sensitivity” (Olatunji et al. 2007; Olatunji et al, 
2009; see also Tybur, Lieberman & Griskevicius, 
2009). While some people easily become disgusted 
by a dirty plate or a drop of blood, others are 
relatively unaffected. As state-disgust has been 
shown to make people condemn disgusting but 
harmless acts more severely (Horberg, et al., 2009), 
it seems relevant to test this on the trait-level as 
well.
   H3) People with high disgust-sensitivity will 
express less consequentialistic attitudes than people 
with low disgust sensitivity. 
1.3  Aim of the current study
   What brings novelty to the current study is firstly 
that the focus is on the trait-level rather than the 
state-level. Instead of manipulating the situation or 
priming the participants into a specific mindset or 
emotional state, this study assumes that there are 
individual differences in cognitive styles, anger-
proneness and disgust-sensitivity. Secondly, three 
quite different aspects of the consequentialism/non-
consequentialism distinction are included. If any of 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  c a n  p r e d i c t 
consequentialistic attitudes in all three of the moral 
aspects, this would give support to the idea that 
consequentialistic and non-consequentialistic 
attitudes mirror differences in personality (Greene, 
2008). 
2.  Method
2.1  Participants
   237 (89 male, 148 female) Japanese participants 
between 18 and 32 years old (mean age 20.73, SD = 
2.20) were recruited from three different Japanese 
universities (International Christian University, 
Ritsumeikan University and St Margarets Junior 
College). All participants individually completed a 
paper and pen questionnaire consisting of the 
following measurements.
2.2  Moral Stories
   Three story categories were created based on the 
included moral aspects (absolute rules, absolute 
loyalty and retributive punishment). Three stories in 
each category described a morally problematic 
situation and each of the nine stories was followed 
by two alternative endings (labeled A and B). The 
endings were written to illustrate two philosophically 
representative answers – one ending to represent a 
typically consequentialistic answer and one ending 
to represent a typically non-consequentialistic 
answer.  1 For example,  the fol lowing story 
represented a story from the retributive punishment 
category. 
Yumi is working as a judge in the court. 
Recently a man who has repeatedly sexually 
abused and tortured a 10-year old girl has been 
convicted to life-time in prison. He will without 
doubt sit in jail for the rest of his life. Yumi 
however can decide in which prison he will 
serve his time. Both prisons cost the same 
amount of tax-money and are considered very 
hard to escape from. The only difference is that 
at prison A the prisoners generally are happy 
and fee l  good ( thanks  to  therapy  and 
medication), while prison B is a traditional 
prison where sexual criminals will be treated 
very badly and probably suffer.
 A: Yumi sends the man to prison A, and the 
man spends the rest of life in prison but feels 
pretty good.
B: Yumi thinks the man deserves to suffer so 
she sends him to prison B, and the man spends 
the rest of life in prison and feels very bad
   After each story and the two alternative endings, 
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participants answered which of the two endings 
they think would be “preferable”. The responses 
were marked on a 7-point Likert Scale (1 = A is 
much better than B; 4 = A and B are equally good/ 
equally bad; 7 = B is much better than A). This 
response represents the participant’s moral attitude.2
   The stories were written in English by the author, 
translated into natural Japanese and then back-
translated by bilingual students. Unclear parts were 
later adjusted by bilingual psychology scholars. The 
moral stories and alternative endings (English or 
Japanese) can be obtained by the author upon 
request.
2.3  Individual Differences
   The participants then completed a questionnaire 
that measured the participant’s cognitive style and 
emotional personality. Cognitive Style was 
measured with the Information Processing Style 
Inventory (IPSI, Naito, Suzuki & Sakamoto, 2004). 
IPSI is based on the Rational-experimental 
inventory (REI, Pacini & Epstein, 1999), measures 
rationality and intuition as two independent 
variables and consists of 24 questions. IPSI is 
written in Japanese and validated using a Japanese 
student sample. 
   In addition, five items that measured anger-
proneness and five items that measured disgust-
sensitivity were included. The anger items were 
constructed by the author while the disgust items 
were based on items that first appeared in the 
Disgust Scale by Haidt, McCauley & Rozin (1994). 
As the Disgust Scale cover a wide array of different 
forms of disgust, and the aim was to focus on non-
moral disgust, I only included items that dealt with 
disgust concerning death and body envelope 
violations (touching corpses or seeing a man with 
his intestines exposed, Rozin et al, 2008; Tybur et 
al, 2009). Some of the items from each aspect were 
reversed. The emotional personality items were 
translated into Japanese and then back-translated by 
professional translators and checked for accuracy 
by Japanese scholars.  All responses were marked 
on a 5-point Likert Scale (1 = does not apply to me 
at all; 5 = does apply to me very much). 3
3.  RESULTS
   In the actual questionnaire, a higher response 
number sometimes illustrated a consequentialistic 
and sometimes illustrated a non-consequentialistic 
attitude. However, in order to simplify interpretation 
of the results, the data reported in this section is 
adjusted so that a higher score illustrates more 
consequentialistic attitudes and a lower score 
illustrates more non-consequentialistic attitudes. 
   The data was scanned for potential outliers. One 
participant had a z-score of -3.35 on the disgust-
sensitivity variable and was considered a statistical 
outl ier  and removed from further analysis 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Principal component 
analyses showed that eight of the nine stories 
robustly loaded well on their expected factors. One 
loyalty-story (nr 8) did not load well on any factor 
and was therefore removed. The remaining stories 
was aggregated to measure one absolute-rule 
category (story 1, 4 and 7), one loyalty category 
(story 2 and 5) and one retribution category (story 3, 
6 and 9). Attitudes towards loyalty and retribution 
correlated weakly (r = .16, p = .017) while the other 
category inter-correlations were non-significant. 
Means and alpha-values for the moral categories as 
well as the independent variables can be seen in 
Table 1. 
   Starting with binary correlations of the included 
var iab les ,  Rat ional i ty  and  In tu i t ion  were 
uncorrelated (r = 0) confirming the predictions by 
Pacini and Epstein (1999). Interestingly, disgust-
sensitivity had weak but significant negative 
correlations with both rationality (r = -.162, p = 
.013) and intuition (r = -.142, p = .040). In contrary 
to the hypotheses, neither rationality nor intuition 
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had any correlation with any of the moral categories 
(see table 2).
   Anger-proneness and disgust-sensitivity were 
uncorrelated (r = .09, ns) confirming that they did 
not measure an underlying single construct. Anger-
proneness was unrelated to attitudes about absolute 
rules and absolute loyalty. However, the correlation 
between anger-proneness and retributive (non-
consequentialistic) attitudes reached significance in 
the expected direction (r = -.13, p = .047), indicating 
that trait-angry people tend to be more positive 
towards retributive punishment. 
   Disgust-sensitivity correlated negatively with 
consequentialistic attitudes in the absolute-rule 
category (r = -.19, p = .003), absolute loyalty 
category (r = -.17,p = .008), and the retributive 
punishment category (r = -.28, p <.001). This 
suggests that people with higher disgust-sensitivity 
are more likely to be positive towards absolute 
rules, absolute loyalty and retributive punishment 
compared to people low on disgust-sensitivity. 
   Next, I conducted three multiple regression 
analyses. I used the response in each of the moral 
categories as the outcome variable in the three 
analyses respectively. The included predictor 
variables in all analyses were rationality, intuition, 
anger-proneness, disgust sensitivity and sex of the 
participant. 
   Using the enter method in the absolute rule 
category, a significant model emerged: F(5,231) = 
2.27, p = .048. Adjusted R 2 was .026 meaning that 
2.6 % of the variance is explained by the model. As 
can be seen in table 3, only disgust-sensitivity was 
a significant predictor. 
   Using the enter model in the loyalty category, a 
borderline significant model emerged F(5,231) = 
2.21, p = .054, adjusted R 2 = .025. Among the 
included predictor variables, only disgust-sensitivity 
was a significant predictor.
   Using the enter model in the retribution category, 
a significant model emerged F(5,231) = 4.10, p = 
.001, adjusted R 2 = .062. Among the included 
predictor variables, only disgust-sensitivity was a 
significant predictor. 
4.  DISCUSSION
   Until now, much research on moral attitudes has 
shown that disgust make us moralize (i.e. make our 
already negative judgments more severe, make us 
punish criminals harder etc.). The current study 
indicates that disgust does not merely predict the 
Table 1
Means and α for included variables (range in parenthesis)
Mean (SD) α
Absolute Rule (1-7) 3.11 (1.33) .58
Absolute Loyalty (1-7) 4.38 (1.39) .55
Retributive Punishment (1-7) 3.81 (1.69) .80
Rational cognitive style (1-5) 3.40 (0.69) .87
Intuitive cognitive style (1-5) 3.11 (0.64) .83
Anger-proneness (1-5) 2.67 (0.84) .71
Disgust-sensitivity (1-5) 3.57 (0.75) .61
Table 2
Pearson two-tailed correlations between consequentialistic moral responses and individual differences
Absolute Rule Absolute Loyalty Retributive Punishment
Rational cognitive style  .050  .122  .063
Intuitive cognitive style -.041  .036 -.052
Anger-proneness -.091 -.012 -.129*
Disgust-sensitivity -.194** -.173** -.283***
Note: * p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p < .001
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degree but also the direction of moral attitudes. 
Disgust-sensitivity significantly correlated with 
non-consequentialistic moral attitudes and this 
pattern was consistent in all three included aspects 
(absolute rules, absolute loyalty and retributive 
punishment). 
   The moralizing effect of disgust has been shown 
previously. Disgusting details affect harsher 
condemnation of otherwise identical moral 
situations (Haidt & Björklund, 2008), and both 
disgustingly dirty desks and repugnant smells, make 
participants judge situations as morally worse 
(Schnall, et al., 2008). Disgust is not like other 
avoidance-focused negative emotions,  but 
influences people differently than sadness or fear 
(Schnal l ,  e t  a l . ,  2008) .  The  l ink  be tween 
contaminating disgust and moral disgust has also 
proven rather strong; hand-washing make disgusted 
peoples moral judgments less severe (Schnall, 
Benton & Harvey, 2008), and moral transgressions 
evoke  the  same fac ia l  express ions  as  the 
consumption of bitter drinks (Champman, et al., 
2009).  
   On the trait-level, high disgust-sensitivity has 
been shown to predict higher perceived threat of 
crime and guilty verdicts in mock juries (Jones & 
Fitness, 2008), implicit negative attitudes towards 
gay men (Inbar, et al., 2009), and towards extreme 
sexual behavior (Haidt & Hersh, 2001). In a moral 
foundation theory-framework (Graham, Haidt & 
Nosek, 2009), disgust sensitivity seems to primarily 
relate to the purity/sanctity foundation while other 
foundations (such as harm and justice) are relatively 
unrelated (Horberg, et al., 2009).  
   One possible explanation for the discovered 
pattern might be evolution (Greene, 2008, Singer, 
2005). Disgust evolved in humans in order to keep 
us away from tainted food, sibling-incest, and other 
genetically harmful things, and then extended into 
social and moral domains (Rozin, et al., 2008; 
Table 3
Unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients for the variables entered into the respective models. 
Absolute Rule Absolute Loyalty Retributive Punishment
Rational cognitive style B  .038  .243  .001
SE.B  .129  .135  .160
β  .019  .120  .000
Intuitive cognitive style B -.151  .017 -.224
SE.B  .136  .142  .168
β -.072  .008 -.092
Anger-proneness B -.117  .015 -.208
SE.B  .102  .106  .126
β -.074  .009 -.104
Disgust-sensitivity B -.351 -.301 -.641
SE.B  .118  .122  .145
β -.197** -.162* -.284***
Sex B  .106  .331 -.122
SE.B  .181  .189  .224
β  .038  .116 -.035
Note: * p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p < .001
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Tybur et al., 2009). It might be possible that the 
categorical aversion towards active killing (an 
absolute rule), the preference towards kin (loyalty) 
and the aversion towards unpunished wrongdoings 
(retribution) are part of our evolutionary history and 
conveyed to us mainly by basic emotions such as 
d i s g u s t .  T h e  c o s t - b e n e f i t  c a l c u l u s  t h a t 
consequentialism relies on does not have the same 
evolutionary history, and in cases in which we are 
faced with a situation that elicits strong disgust, the 
cost-benefit calculation will rarely even begin 
before an emotionally based moral judgment is 
made (Haidt & Björklund, 2008). Plausibly, this 
would be more obvious in people who are more 
reactive towards disgust and less obvious in people 
with low disgust-sensitivity. 
   The consistent pattern discovered in this study 
was found despite the conscious choice to limit 
disgust-sensitivity towards disgust felt towards 
death and body envelope violations. These aspects 
of disgust are part of the pathogen domain using the 
classification by Tybur et al (2009), and hence not 
as interpersonal as sexual disgust or moral disgust. 
While moral disgust usually correlates positively 
with anger (Hutcherson & Gross 2011), the disgust-
sensitivity measured in this study did not correlate 
with anger-proneness. Future studies about disgust-
sensitivity and moral attitudes should investigate if 
different disgust-domains relate to specific attitudes.
   The correlations between anger-proneness and 
consequentialism were negative in all three aspects, 
but generally non-signifieant. Surprisingly, neither 
rational nor intuitive cognitive style had any 
correlation with moral attitudes in this study. This 
might be because the emotional gut-feeling is the 
default when faced with serious moral dilemmas 
(Haidt, 2001).  
   There are some obvious limitations of this study. 
Firstly, as illustrated by the low α-values, the 
included moral aspect-categories are not yet 
optimal. As the stories were constructed with 
philosophical face-validity and generalizability in 
mind, internal reliability was somehow sacrificed. 
Likewise, the anger and disgust measurements used 
in this study have room for improvement and 
expansion. 
   Effect-sizes in this study were generally low. One 
reason for this might be the methodological 
problems discussed above. However, even with 
improved measurements, it  is unlikely that 
individual differences will predict the majority of 
variance in moral attitudes. Nonetheless, this study 
found a consistent negative relationship between a 
trait (non-moral disgust-sensitivity) and a moral 
tendency (consequentialism) and this relation was 
not limited to a single situation but found in three 
very different aspects of consequentialism.
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Endnotes
1	 To label one answer consequentialistic and 
the other non-consequentialistic is naturally 
difficult and this definition should be seen as 
instrumental. Like Greene (2008) I admit that it is 
possible to reach a typical non-consequentialistic 
decision via consequential ist ic reasoning 
or vice versa. Hence a “consequentialistic 
response” merely illustrates a moral attitude 
that  is  comparably easier  to just i fy  wi th 
consequentialistic arguments while a “non-
consequentialistic response” illustrate an attitude 
that is easier to justify with non-consequentialistic 
arguments. 
2	 Participants responded to three other questions 
as well (such as own expected behavior, majority 
attitudes/behavior, perceived harm, perceived 
naturalness etc.). In the current study, the focus 
is on moral attitudes and therefore I only report 
results for this variable.   
3	 To avoid hypothesis detection, five filler items 
were also included. 
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